mirror of
1
Fork 0
forgejo/routers/web/auth/auth.go

822 lines
24 KiB
Go
Raw Normal View History

2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// Copyright 2014 The Gogs Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2018 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
package auth
import (
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/db"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/auth/password"
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/base"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/context"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/eventsource"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/log"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/session"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/setting"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/timeutil"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/util"
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/web"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/web/middleware"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/routers/utils"
auth_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/auth/source/oauth2"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/externalaccount"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/forms"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/services/mailer"
"github.com/markbates/goth"
)
const (
// tplSignIn template for sign in page
tplSignIn base.TplName = "user/auth/signin"
// tplSignUp template path for sign up page
tplSignUp base.TplName = "user/auth/signup"
// TplActivate template path for activate user
TplActivate base.TplName = "user/auth/activate"
)
// autoSignIn reads cookie and try to auto-login.
func autoSignIn(ctx *context.Context) (bool, error) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
isSucceed := false
defer func() {
if !isSucceed {
ctx.DeleteSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}()
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
authCookie := ctx.GetSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName)
if len(authCookie) == 0 {
return false, nil
}
lookupKey, validator, found := strings.Cut(authCookie, ":")
if !found {
return false, nil
}
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
authToken, err := auth.FindAuthToken(ctx, lookupKey)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) {
return false, nil
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
return false, err
}
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
if authToken.IsExpired() {
err = auth.DeleteAuthToken(ctx, authToken)
return false, err
}
rawValidator, err := hex.DecodeString(validator)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(authToken.HashedValidator), []byte(auth.HashValidator(rawValidator))) == 0 {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return false, nil
}
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
u, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, authToken.UID)
if err != nil {
if !user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
return false, fmt.Errorf("GetUserByID: %w", err)
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return false, nil
}
isSucceed = true
if err := updateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
// Set session IDs
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
"uid": u.ID,
}); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("unable to updateSession: %w", err)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if err := resetLocale(ctx, u); err != nil {
return false, err
}
ctx.Csrf.DeleteCookie(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return true, nil
}
func resetLocale(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User) error {
// Language setting of the user overwrites the one previously set
// If the user does not have a locale set, we save the current one.
if len(u.Language) == 0 {
u.Language = ctx.Locale.Language()
if err := user_model.UpdateUserCols(ctx, u, "language"); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return err
}
}
middleware.SetLocaleCookie(ctx.Resp, u.Language, 0)
if ctx.Locale.Language() != u.Language {
ctx.Locale = middleware.Locale(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req)
}
return nil
}
func CheckAutoLogin(ctx *context.Context) bool {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// Check auto-login
isSucceed, err := autoSignIn(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("autoSignIn", err)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return true
}
redirectTo := ctx.FormString("redirect_to")
if len(redirectTo) > 0 {
middleware.SetRedirectToCookie(ctx.Resp, redirectTo)
} else {
redirectTo = ctx.GetSiteCookie("redirect_to")
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if isSucceed {
middleware.DeleteRedirectToCookie(ctx.Resp)
nextRedirectTo := setting.AppSubURL + string(setting.LandingPageURL)
if setting.LandingPageURL == setting.LandingPageLogin {
nextRedirectTo = setting.AppSubURL + "/" // do not cycle-redirect to the login page
}
ctx.RedirectToFirst(redirectTo, nextRedirectTo)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return true
}
return false
}
// SignIn render sign in page
func SignIn(ctx *context.Context) {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_in")
if CheckAutoLogin(ctx) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return
}
oauth2Providers, err := oauth2.GetOAuth2Providers(ctx, util.OptionalBoolTrue)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
ctx.Data["OAuth2Providers"] = oauth2Providers
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_in")
ctx.Data["SignInLink"] = setting.AppSubURL + "/user/login"
ctx.Data["PageIsSignIn"] = true
ctx.Data["PageIsLogin"] = true
ctx.Data["EnableSSPI"] = auth.IsSSPIEnabled(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if setting.Service.EnableCaptcha && setting.Service.RequireCaptchaForLogin {
context.SetCaptchaData(ctx)
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, tplSignIn)
}
// SignInPost response for sign in request
func SignInPost(ctx *context.Context) {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_in")
oauth2Providers, err := oauth2.GetOAuth2Providers(ctx, util.OptionalBoolTrue)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
ctx.Data["OAuth2Providers"] = oauth2Providers
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_in")
ctx.Data["SignInLink"] = setting.AppSubURL + "/user/login"
ctx.Data["PageIsSignIn"] = true
ctx.Data["PageIsLogin"] = true
ctx.Data["EnableSSPI"] = auth.IsSSPIEnabled(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if ctx.HasError() {
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, tplSignIn)
return
}
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*forms.SignInForm)
if setting.Service.EnableCaptcha && setting.Service.RequireCaptchaForLogin {
context.SetCaptchaData(ctx)
context.VerifyCaptcha(ctx, tplSignIn, form)
if ctx.Written() {
return
}
}
u, source, err := auth_service.UserSignIn(ctx, form.UserName, form.Password)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) || errors.Is(err, util.ErrInvalidArgument) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.username_password_incorrect"), tplSignIn, &form)
log.Info("Failed authentication attempt for %s from %s: %v", form.UserName, ctx.RemoteAddr(), err)
} else if user_model.IsErrEmailAlreadyUsed(err) {
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.email_been_used"), tplSignIn, &form)
log.Info("Failed authentication attempt for %s from %s: %v", form.UserName, ctx.RemoteAddr(), err)
} else if user_model.IsErrUserProhibitLogin(err) {
log.Info("Failed authentication attempt for %s from %s: %v", form.UserName, ctx.RemoteAddr(), err)
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.prohibit_login")
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, "user/auth/prohibit_login")
} else if user_model.IsErrUserInactive(err) {
if setting.Service.RegisterEmailConfirm {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.active_your_account")
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
} else {
log.Info("Failed authentication attempt for %s from %s: %v", form.UserName, ctx.RemoteAddr(), err)
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.prohibit_login")
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, "user/auth/prohibit_login")
}
} else {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
}
return
}
// Now handle 2FA:
// First of all if the source can skip local two fa we're done
if skipper, ok := source.Cfg.(auth_service.LocalTwoFASkipper); ok && skipper.IsSkipLocalTwoFA() {
handleSignIn(ctx, u, form.Remember)
return
}
// If this user is enrolled in 2FA TOTP, we can't sign the user in just yet.
// Instead, redirect them to the 2FA authentication page.
hasTOTPtwofa, err := auth.HasTwoFactorByUID(ctx, u.ID)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
// Check if the user has webauthn registration
hasWebAuthnTwofa, err := auth.HasWebAuthnRegistrationsByUID(ctx, u.ID)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
if !hasTOTPtwofa && !hasWebAuthnTwofa {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// No two factor auth configured we can sign in the user
handleSignIn(ctx, u, form.Remember)
return
}
updates := map[string]any{
// User will need to use 2FA TOTP or WebAuthn, save data
"twofaUid": u.ID,
"twofaRemember": form.Remember,
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if hasTOTPtwofa {
// User will need to use WebAuthn, save data
updates["totpEnrolled"] = u.ID
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if err := updateSession(ctx, nil, updates); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn: Unable to update session", err)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return
}
// If we have WebAuthn redirect there first
if hasWebAuthnTwofa {
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/webauthn")
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return
}
// Fallback to 2FA
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/two_factor")
}
// This handles the final part of the sign-in process of the user.
func handleSignIn(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User, remember bool) {
redirect := handleSignInFull(ctx, u, remember, true)
if ctx.Written() {
return
}
ctx.Redirect(redirect)
}
func handleSignInFull(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User, remember, obeyRedirect bool) string {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if remember {
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
if err := ctx.SetLTACookie(u); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("GenerateAuthToken", err)
return setting.AppSubURL + "/"
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if err := updateSession(ctx, []string{
// Delete the openid, 2fa and linkaccount data
"openid_verified_uri",
"openid_signin_remember",
"openid_determined_email",
"openid_determined_username",
"twofaUid",
"twofaRemember",
"linkAccount",
}, map[string]any{
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
"uid": u.ID,
}); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.ServerError("RegenerateSession", err)
return setting.AppSubURL + "/"
}
// Language setting of the user overwrites the one previously set
// If the user does not have a locale set, we save the current one.
if len(u.Language) == 0 {
u.Language = ctx.Locale.Language()
if err := user_model.UpdateUserCols(ctx, u, "language"); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.ServerError("UpdateUserCols Language", fmt.Errorf("Error updating user language [user: %d, locale: %s]", u.ID, u.Language))
return setting.AppSubURL + "/"
}
}
middleware.SetLocaleCookie(ctx.Resp, u.Language, 0)
if ctx.Locale.Language() != u.Language {
ctx.Locale = middleware.Locale(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req)
}
// Clear whatever CSRF cookie has right now, force to generate a new one
ctx.Csrf.DeleteCookie(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// Register last login
u.SetLastLogin()
if err := user_model.UpdateUserCols(ctx, u, "last_login_unix"); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.ServerError("UpdateUserCols", err)
return setting.AppSubURL + "/"
}
if redirectTo := ctx.GetSiteCookie("redirect_to"); len(redirectTo) > 0 && !utils.IsExternalURL(redirectTo) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
middleware.DeleteRedirectToCookie(ctx.Resp)
if obeyRedirect {
ctx.RedirectToFirst(redirectTo)
}
return redirectTo
}
if obeyRedirect {
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/")
}
return setting.AppSubURL + "/"
}
func getUserName(gothUser *goth.User) (string, error) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
switch setting.OAuth2Client.Username {
case setting.OAuth2UsernameEmail:
return user_model.NormalizeUserName(strings.Split(gothUser.Email, "@")[0])
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
case setting.OAuth2UsernameNickname:
return user_model.NormalizeUserName(gothUser.NickName)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
default: // OAuth2UsernameUserid
return gothUser.UserID, nil
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}
// HandleSignOut resets the session and sets the cookies
func HandleSignOut(ctx *context.Context) {
_ = ctx.Session.Flush()
_ = ctx.Session.Destroy(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req)
ctx.DeleteSiteCookie(setting.CookieRememberName)
ctx.Csrf.DeleteCookie(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
middleware.DeleteRedirectToCookie(ctx.Resp)
}
// SignOut sign out from login status
func SignOut(ctx *context.Context) {
if ctx.Doer != nil {
eventsource.GetManager().SendMessageBlocking(ctx.Doer.ID, &eventsource.Event{
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
Name: "logout",
Data: ctx.Session.ID(),
})
}
HandleSignOut(ctx)
ctx.JSONRedirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/")
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
// SignUp render the register page
func SignUp(ctx *context.Context) {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_up")
ctx.Data["SignUpLink"] = setting.AppSubURL + "/user/sign_up"
oauth2Providers, err := oauth2.GetOAuth2Providers(ctx, util.OptionalBoolTrue)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignUp", err)
return
}
ctx.Data["OAuth2Providers"] = oauth2Providers
context.SetCaptchaData(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.Data["PageIsSignUp"] = true
// Show Disabled Registration message if DisableRegistration or AllowOnlyExternalRegistration options are true
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.Data["DisableRegistration"] = setting.Service.DisableRegistration || setting.Service.AllowOnlyExternalRegistration
redirectTo := ctx.FormString("redirect_to")
if len(redirectTo) > 0 {
middleware.SetRedirectToCookie(ctx.Resp, redirectTo)
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, tplSignUp)
}
// SignUpPost response for sign up information submission
func SignUpPost(ctx *context.Context) {
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*forms.RegisterForm)
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("sign_up")
ctx.Data["SignUpLink"] = setting.AppSubURL + "/user/sign_up"
oauth2Providers, err := oauth2.GetOAuth2Providers(ctx, util.OptionalBoolTrue)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignUp", err)
return
}
ctx.Data["OAuth2Providers"] = oauth2Providers
context.SetCaptchaData(ctx)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.Data["PageIsSignUp"] = true
// Permission denied if DisableRegistration or AllowOnlyExternalRegistration options are true
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if setting.Service.DisableRegistration || setting.Service.AllowOnlyExternalRegistration {
ctx.Error(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if ctx.HasError() {
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, tplSignUp)
return
}
context.VerifyCaptcha(ctx, tplSignUp, form)
if ctx.Written() {
return
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if !form.IsEmailDomainAllowed() {
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("auth.email_domain_blacklisted"), tplSignUp, &form)
return
}
if form.Password != form.Retype {
ctx.Data["Err_Password"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.password_not_match"), tplSignUp, &form)
return
}
if len(form.Password) < setting.MinPasswordLength {
ctx.Data["Err_Password"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("auth.password_too_short", setting.MinPasswordLength), tplSignUp, &form)
return
}
if !password.IsComplexEnough(form.Password) {
ctx.Data["Err_Password"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(password.BuildComplexityError(ctx.Locale), tplSignUp, &form)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return
}
pwned, err := password.IsPwned(ctx, form.Password)
if pwned {
errMsg := ctx.Tr("auth.password_pwned")
if err != nil {
log.Error(err.Error())
errMsg = ctx.Tr("auth.password_pwned_err")
}
ctx.Data["Err_Password"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(errMsg, tplSignUp, &form)
return
}
u := &user_model.User{
Name: form.UserName,
Email: form.Email,
Passwd: form.Password,
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
if !createAndHandleCreatedUser(ctx, tplSignUp, form, u, nil, nil, false) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// error already handled
return
}
ctx.Flash.Success(ctx.Tr("auth.sign_up_successful"))
handleSignIn(ctx, u, false)
}
// createAndHandleCreatedUser calls createUserInContext and
// then handleUserCreated.
func createAndHandleCreatedUser(ctx *context.Context, tpl base.TplName, form any, u *user_model.User, overwrites *user_model.CreateUserOverwriteOptions, gothUser *goth.User, allowLink bool) bool {
if !createUserInContext(ctx, tpl, form, u, overwrites, gothUser, allowLink) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
return false
}
return handleUserCreated(ctx, u, gothUser)
}
// createUserInContext creates a user and handles errors within a given context.
// Optionally a template can be specified.
func createUserInContext(ctx *context.Context, tpl base.TplName, form any, u *user_model.User, overwrites *user_model.CreateUserOverwriteOptions, gothUser *goth.User, allowLink bool) (ok bool) {
if err := user_model.CreateUser(ctx, u, overwrites); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if allowLink && (user_model.IsErrUserAlreadyExist(err) || user_model.IsErrEmailAlreadyUsed(err)) {
if setting.OAuth2Client.AccountLinking == setting.OAuth2AccountLinkingAuto {
var user *user_model.User
user = &user_model.User{Name: u.Name}
hasUser, err := user_model.GetUser(ctx, user)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if !hasUser || err != nil {
user = &user_model.User{Email: u.Email}
hasUser, err = user_model.GetUser(ctx, user)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if !hasUser || err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserLinkAccount", err)
return false
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}
// TODO: probably we should respect 'remember' user's choice...
linkAccount(ctx, user, *gothUser, true)
return false // user is already created here, all redirects are handled
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
} else if setting.OAuth2Client.AccountLinking == setting.OAuth2AccountLinkingLogin {
showLinkingLogin(ctx, *gothUser)
return false // user will be created only after linking login
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}
// handle error without template
if len(tpl) == 0 {
ctx.ServerError("CreateUser", err)
return false
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
// handle error with template
switch {
case user_model.IsErrUserAlreadyExist(err):
ctx.Data["Err_UserName"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.username_been_taken"), tpl, form)
case user_model.IsErrEmailAlreadyUsed(err):
ctx.Data["Err_Email"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.email_been_used"), tpl, form)
case user_model.IsErrEmailCharIsNotSupported(err):
ctx.Data["Err_Email"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.email_invalid"), tpl, form)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
case user_model.IsErrEmailInvalid(err):
ctx.Data["Err_Email"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("form.email_invalid"), tpl, form)
case db.IsErrNameReserved(err):
ctx.Data["Err_UserName"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("user.form.name_reserved", err.(db.ErrNameReserved).Name), tpl, form)
case db.IsErrNamePatternNotAllowed(err):
ctx.Data["Err_UserName"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("user.form.name_pattern_not_allowed", err.(db.ErrNamePatternNotAllowed).Pattern), tpl, form)
case db.IsErrNameCharsNotAllowed(err):
ctx.Data["Err_UserName"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErr(ctx.Tr("user.form.name_chars_not_allowed", err.(db.ErrNameCharsNotAllowed).Name), tpl, form)
default:
ctx.ServerError("CreateUser", err)
}
return false
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
log.Trace("Account created: %s", u.Name)
return true
}
// handleUserCreated does additional steps after a new user is created.
// It auto-sets admin for the only user, updates the optional external user and
// sends a confirmation email if required.
func handleUserCreated(ctx *context.Context, u *user_model.User, gothUser *goth.User) (ok bool) {
// Auto-set admin for the only user.
if user_model.CountUsers(ctx, nil) == 1 {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
u.IsAdmin = true
u.IsActive = true
u.SetLastLogin()
if err := user_model.UpdateUserCols(ctx, u, "is_admin", "is_active", "last_login_unix"); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.ServerError("UpdateUser", err)
return false
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}
// update external user information
if gothUser != nil {
if err := externalaccount.UpdateExternalUser(ctx, u, *gothUser); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) {
log.Error("UpdateExternalUser failed: %v", err)
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}
// Send confirmation email
if !u.IsActive && u.ID > 1 {
if setting.Service.RegisterManualConfirm {
ctx.Data["ManualActivationOnly"] = true
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return false
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
mailer.SendActivateAccountMail(ctx.Locale, u)
ctx.Data["IsSendRegisterMail"] = true
ctx.Data["Email"] = u.Email
ctx.Data["ActiveCodeLives"] = timeutil.MinutesToFriendly(setting.Service.ActiveCodeLives, ctx.Locale)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
if err := ctx.Cache.Put("MailResendLimit_"+u.LowerName, u.LowerName, 180); err != nil {
log.Error("Set cache(MailResendLimit) fail: %v", err)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
return false
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
return true
}
// Activate render activate user page
func Activate(ctx *context.Context) {
code := ctx.FormString("code")
if len(code) == 0 {
ctx.Data["IsActivatePage"] = true
if ctx.Doer == nil || ctx.Doer.IsActive {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.NotFound("invalid user", nil)
return
}
// Resend confirmation email.
if setting.Service.RegisterEmailConfirm {
if ctx.Cache.IsExist("MailResendLimit_" + ctx.Doer.LowerName) {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.Data["ResendLimited"] = true
} else {
ctx.Data["ActiveCodeLives"] = timeutil.MinutesToFriendly(setting.Service.ActiveCodeLives, ctx.Locale)
mailer.SendActivateAccountMail(ctx.Locale, ctx.Doer)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if err := ctx.Cache.Put("MailResendLimit_"+ctx.Doer.LowerName, ctx.Doer.LowerName, 180); err != nil {
log.Error("Set cache(MailResendLimit) fail: %v", err)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
}
}
} else {
ctx.Data["ServiceNotEnabled"] = true
}
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return
}
user := user_model.VerifyUserActiveCode(ctx, code)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// if code is wrong
if user == nil {
ctx.Data["IsCodeInvalid"] = true
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return
}
// if account is local account, verify password
if user.LoginSource == 0 {
ctx.Data["Code"] = code
ctx.Data["NeedsPassword"] = true
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return
}
handleAccountActivation(ctx, user)
}
// ActivatePost handles account activation with password check
func ActivatePost(ctx *context.Context) {
code := ctx.FormString("code")
if len(code) == 0 {
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/activate")
return
}
user := user_model.VerifyUserActiveCode(ctx, code)
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// if code is wrong
if user == nil {
ctx.Data["IsCodeInvalid"] = true
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return
}
// if account is local account, verify password
if user.LoginSource == 0 {
password := ctx.FormString("password")
if len(password) == 0 {
ctx.Data["Code"] = code
ctx.Data["NeedsPassword"] = true
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return
}
if !user.ValidatePassword(password) {
ctx.Data["IsPasswordInvalid"] = true
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.HTML(http.StatusOK, TplActivate)
return
}
}
handleAccountActivation(ctx, user)
}
func handleAccountActivation(ctx *context.Context, user *user_model.User) {
user.IsActive = true
var err error
if user.Rands, err = user_model.GetUserSalt(); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UpdateUser", err)
return
}
if err := user_model.UpdateUserCols(ctx, user, "is_active", "rands"); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
if user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
ctx.NotFound("UpdateUserCols", err)
} else {
ctx.ServerError("UpdateUser", err)
}
return
}
if err := user_model.ActivateUserEmail(ctx, user.ID, user.Email, true); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
log.Error("Unable to activate email for user: %-v with email: %s: %v", user, user.Email, err)
ctx.ServerError("ActivateUserEmail", err)
return
}
log.Trace("User activated: %s", user.Name)
if err := updateSession(ctx, nil, map[string]any{
[SECURITY] Rework long-term authentication - This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been left out. - The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6) (cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9) (cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3) (cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1) (cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af) (cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb) Conflicts: services/auth/auth_token_test.go https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069 (cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e) (cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500) (cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
2023-11-22 17:26:21 +01:00
"uid": user.ID,
}); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
log.Error("Unable to regenerate session for user: %-v with email: %s: %v", user, user.Email, err)
ctx.ServerError("ActivateUserEmail", err)
return
}
if err := resetLocale(ctx, user); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("resetLocale", err)
return
}
// Register last login
user.SetLastLogin()
if err := user_model.UpdateUserCols(ctx, user, "last_login_unix"); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UpdateUserCols", err)
return
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.Flash.Success(ctx.Tr("auth.account_activated"))
if redirectTo := ctx.GetSiteCookie("redirect_to"); len(redirectTo) > 0 {
middleware.DeleteRedirectToCookie(ctx.Resp)
ctx.RedirectToFirst(redirectTo)
return
}
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/")
}
// ActivateEmail render the activate email page
func ActivateEmail(ctx *context.Context) {
code := ctx.FormString("code")
emailStr := ctx.FormString("email")
// Verify code.
if email := user_model.VerifyActiveEmailCode(ctx, code, emailStr); email != nil {
if err := user_model.ActivateEmail(ctx, email); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
ctx.ServerError("ActivateEmail", err)
}
log.Trace("Email activated: %s", email.Email)
ctx.Flash.Success(ctx.Tr("settings.add_email_success"))
if u, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, email.UID); err != nil {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
log.Warn("GetUserByID: %d", email.UID)
} else {
2022-01-02 14:12:35 +01:00
// Allow user to validate more emails
_ = ctx.Cache.Delete("MailResendLimit_" + u.LowerName)
}
}
// FIXME: e-mail verification does not require the user to be logged in,
// so this could be redirecting to the login page.
// Should users be logged in automatically here? (consider 2FA requirements, etc.)
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/user/settings/account")
}
func updateSession(ctx *context.Context, deletes []string, updates map[string]any) error {
if _, err := session.RegenerateSession(ctx.Resp, ctx.Req); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("regenerate session: %w", err)
}
sess := ctx.Session
sessID := sess.ID()
for _, k := range deletes {
if err := sess.Delete(k); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete %v in session[%s]: %w", k, sessID, err)
}
}
for k, v := range updates {
if err := sess.Set(k, v); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("set %v in session[%s]: %w", k, sessID, err)
}
}
if err := sess.Release(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("store session[%s]: %w", sessID, err)
}
return nil
}